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STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION VERSUS THE
COMMERCE POWER'
K. Dennis Sisk*
As commerce and industry have invaded once virgin lands and
waters in an era of heightened environmental consciousness, in-
creasing numbers of state legislatures have responded with strict
environmental protection measures. 2 Environmental protection is
unquestionably a legitimate state interest, but such measures often
impede the flow of interstate commerce. This article addresses the
tension between state environmental protection statutes and the
federal constitution's commerce clause.' The essential thesis is that
traditional commerce clause analysis has not been applied with
sufficient sensitivity to adequately reconcile state environmental
interests with federal commercial interests.4
I. TRADITIONAL COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS AND ITS APPLICATION TO
STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
Commerce clause analysis of state legislation is generally divided
into two areas: (1) preemption by congressional legislation enacted
pursuant to the commerce clause, and (2) conflict with the
"dormant" commerce clause in the absence of congressional legisla-
* B.A., Vanderbilt University, 1974; J.D., 1978. Presently associated with Hunton and
Williams, Richmond, Virginia.
1. The analytical insights of Professor Thomas R. McCoy of the Vanderbilt University
School of Law provided great assistance in the development of this article. The helpful
commentary of W. Taylor Reveley, III, William A. Anderson, and F. Case Whittemore are
also gratefully acknowledged.
2. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.011-376.21 (Supp. 1973), 38 ME. REv. STAT. ANm. § 541-
557 (1970), WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 88.16.170 (Supp. 1975).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. At the outset, some disclaimers are necessary. First, this article does not collect or
analyze all judicial authority confronting the conflict between state environmental legislation
and the commerce clause; only those cases that are noteworthy for illustrative purposes are
discussed. Second, in discussing or alluding to the intricate interactions between man's
activities and the environment, this article does not purport to be technically thorough or
authoritative; rather, environmental impacts are discussed in generalized terms to illustrate
various points under discussion. Finally, this article does not presume to resolve the complex
issue of the proper reconciliation of federal commercial interests and local environmental
concerns. It merely attempts to take the level of analysis of state environmental interests a
step beyond present law.
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tion.5 Both areas ultimately revolve around the supremacy of federal
law,6 constitutional or statutory, over contrary state law. Commerce
clause analysis involves the reconciliation of the competing federal
and state interests.
A. Preemption
When Congress exercises its authority under the commerce clause
by enacting legislation that touches the same subject matter that a
state seeks to regulate, the congressional legislation overrides con-
trary state regulation by virtue of the supremacy clause. A court's
central function in this context is to determine if the state legisla-
tion conflicts with federal legislation. The conflict with federal legis-
lation may be express or implied.
1. Express Preemption
Express preemption may arise in three ways. First, Congress may
incorporate in the federal statute an unambiguous provision which
displaces state regulation of the same subject matter.7 Second, the
two regulatory schemes may impose conflicting commands on the
regulated activity making it impossible to comply with both.8 Third,
the state legislation may undermine the enforcement or objectives
of the federal scheme.9
5. Note, State Environmental Protection Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87 HAv.
L. REV. 1762, 1769 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Environmental Legislation]; see generally
Soper, The Constitutional Framework of Environmental Law, FEDERAL EINVIfONMENTAL LAW
20, 77-100 (ed. E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert 1974).
6. See Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
7. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), the Court invalidated an Illinois
statute requiring grain elevator operators to obtain licenses from the state. The Federal
Warehouse Act provided that federal licensing "shall be exclusive." This language unambi-
guously displaced the state law. Id. at 224, 233, 234, 236.
8. See Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961) (Federal Tobacco Inspection Act required
certain type of tobacco to be identified with blue ticket; Georgia Tobacco Identification Act
required same tobacco to be identified with white ticket).
9. E.g., Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132
(1976) (state law may not upset balance between labor and management struck by National
Labor Relations Act); Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964); Pennsylvania v.
Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505 (1956). This third form of express preemption is more subtle than
the other two forms, and thus may not be identified as "express" preemption by all commen-
tators.
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2. Implied Preemption
An implied congressional intent to preempt state legislation may
be found on three grounds. First, federal regulation of the subject
matter may be so pervasive as to indicate a congressional intent to
occupy the field.'" Second, the federal interest in the subject matter
may be so dominant that state regulation is preempted." Finally, a
need for national uniform standards to govern the activity may
preclude state regulation.' 2
The last two grounds are thinly disguised repetitions of two key
considerations applied under the dormant commerce clause." In the
absence of congressional legislation, a dominant federal interest or
a need for national uniform regulation will displace state regulation
of the subject matter. Moreover, federal regulation is rarely found
to be "pervasive" unless one of these two considerations is also
present.'4 Pervasiveness thus does not appear to be a truly indepen-
dent ground for invalidating state legislation; rather, its use is con-
tingent on the presence of one or two considerations that would
displace state legislation under the dormant commerce clause.' 5
For these reasons, it appears that implied preemption is merely
a disguised invalidation of state law by operation of the commerce
clause itself.'6 This article leaves aside the question of express
preemption and addresses the application of pure commerce clause
considerations to state environmental legislation. These considera-
tions may arise in either dormant commerce clause or implied
preemption contexts.
10. Compare City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Term. Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) and
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502, 504 (1956) with Florida Lime & Avocado Growers
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-42 (1963).
11. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1956) (foreign affairs); Hines v. Davidow-
itz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941) (foreign affairs).
12. Burbank v. Lockheed Air Term. Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639 (1973); Pennsylvania v. Nelson,
350 U.S. 497, 505 (1956); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941).
13. See text accompanying notes 65-77 infra.
14. Compare, e.g., cases cited note 10 supra with cases cited notes 11 and 12 supra.
15. The Supreme Court has probably preferred the preemption garb in order to give Con-
gress a greater role in defining federal-state relationships under the commerce clause. See,
e.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 272 n.6 (1977) (striking down discrimina-
tory state legislation on preemption grounds and noting that decision "is subject to legislative
overruling").
16. In theory at least, Congress is not free to reverse a constitutional holding based on the
commerce clause, though it may reverse an implied preemption holding. See note 15 supra.
But see Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
1979]
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B. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The concern of the judiciary in applying the commerce clause is
an allocation of powers between the state and federal governments.
The ultimate issue is: which legislature is more appropriate to regu-
late the subject matter? The commerce clause is a grant of power
to Congress. The grant of that power in itself places regulation of
some activities beyond the reach of state power; 7 regulation of other
activities is beyond the reach of federal power;' the power to regu-
late other activities is concurrent. 9 "Dormant" commerce clause
analysis addresses the appropriate scope of the first category of
activities: those beyond the reach of state power even in the absence
of pertinent congressional legislation. No single analytical structure
has been devised to define the limits of state power in the face of
the dormant commerce clause. 0
1. Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce
A threshold issue is whether the state legislation in question dis-
criminates against interstate commerce. The main purpose of the
commerce clause is to equalize the competitive opportunities of the
states and to create a zone of free trade by preventing local trade
barriers which prefer resident commercial interests over interstate
commercial interests .2 The commerce clause is intended to prevent
the "economic Balkanization" of the nation to the detriment of all
states.22 If a state statute discriminates against interstate com-
merce, it is virtually per se invalid.? The essential rationale is that
local political processes can be expected to prevent legislative
17. E.g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370 (1976). But
see Department of Rev. v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 749
(1978).
18. This category of activities is small indeed in light of cases such as Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
19. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 143 (1851).
20. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1978).
21. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977); Great Atl &
Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370 (1976); Environmental Legislation, supra note 5
at 1764 n.11. In H. P. Hood & Sons v. Dumond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), the Court invalidated a
state's denial of a license for a milk shipping plant for an interstate dealer, because the denial
was based on the state's desire to increase the local supply of milk and prevent competition
for that supply by interstate concerns.
22. See Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 286 (1977); American Can Co. v.
Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 517 P.2d 691, 696 (Or. App. 1973).
23. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970).
[Vol. 13:197
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abuses if the statute applies even-handedly to intrastate and inter-
state commercial interests.2 4 The local interests have input into the
state legislative process, and thus provide an "inner political check"
against excessive burdens on commerce. Where such an inner pol-
itical check is lacking, the state legislature presumably will give
undue weight to local concerns and not adequately consider (or
affirmatively desire) heavy burdens on interstate interests. The free
trade value embodied in the commerce clause thus flatly overrides
local economic protectionism.
Though courts unanimously agree that environmental protection
is a legitimate and important state interest,2 regulation purporting
to advance that interest will be struck down if it discriminates
against commerce. In Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.,r2 the
Court invalidated a Virginia statute that prohibited non-residents
from catching a certain species of fish in the Chesapeake Bay. More
recently, the Court overturned New Jersey's ban on the disposal of
out-of-state garbage in New Jersey landfill sites.8 The Court char-
acterized the state's landfill sites as a "natural resource" and thus
viewed the New Jersey statute as a prohibited protectionist measure
designed to prevent other states from sharing New Jersey's re-
sources. 29 Generally then, a state may not restrict exploitation of, or
24. There are cases in which state legislation that applies evenhandedly on its face in fact
falls almost exclusively on interstate commerce. See Environmental Legislation, supra note
5, at 1774 & n.72. In such cases, a court is more likely to invalidate the state legislation.
Compare Lemke v. Farmer Grain. Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922) (invalidating state regulation of
minimum price of wheat where most wheat was shipped out of state) with Milk Control Bd.
v. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346 (1939) (upholding state regulation of minimum price
of milk where most milk was sold inside state). This tendency does not apply in cases
involving taxes on interstate commerce. See note 71 infra and accompanying text.
25. E.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 n.18, 446-47 (1978).
26. Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc. 431 U.S. 265, 277 (1977); City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Term. Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362
U.S. 440, 445 (1960). Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Douglas is particularly emphatic in its
recognition of the validity of purpose behind state "regulations designed to conserve and
maintain the collective natural resources of the State." 431 U.S. at 288 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27. 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
28. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S. Ct. 2531 (1978); see Hardage v. Atkins, 12
E.R.C. 1043 (10th Cir. 1978).
29. 98 S. Ct. at 2537-38. But see Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 98 S. Ct. 1852 (1978)
(upholding Montana statute that imposes higher license fee for nonresidents than for resi-
dents to hunt elk under privileges and immunities clause); Hughes v. State, 572 P.2d 573
(Okla. Crim. App. 1978), prob. juris. noted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3221 (Oct. 3, 1978). While facially
appealing, the Court's characterization of New Jersey's statute is not completely satisfactory.
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damage to, local resources by nonresidents when it places no similar
restriction on residents.
2. Need for National Uniform Regulation of the Subject Matter
A classic test for determining the constitutionality of state legisla-
tion under the commerce clause was posited in Cooley v. Board of
Wardens.3 0 This test requires a court to determine whether the sub-
ject matter that the state seeks to regulate is more appropriate for
national uniform regulation or for varying state regulation.3 ' If the
subject matter requires a single national system of regulation, the
state legislation will be overridden by the commerce clause. If vary-
ing local conditions suggest that varying local solutions are appro-
priate, the state legislation will probably be upheld. 2
A need for national uniform regulation may arise on two grounds:
(1) a dominant federal interest in the subject matter,3 or (2) a
The statute did not discriminate against out-of-state commercial interests because the main
economic burden fell on New Jersey landfill operators who were precluded from accepting and
charging for the disposal of out-of-state wastes. An "inner political check" was clearly pres-
ent. Nor did the statute discriminate on environmental grounds. The statute left New Jersey
with the environmental degradation resulting from its own wastes while it precluded other
states from imposing their wastes on New Jersey. The effect of invalidating the statute is to
force New Jersey to bear the environmental degradation resulting from activities inside and
outside New Jersey while other states generate garbage but remain clean. The Court inti-
mated that a different New Jersey statute that even-handedly prevented the disposal in New
Jersey of all waste, whatever its origin, would be constitutional. 98 S. Ct. at 2537-38. The
practical effect of such a statute, however, would be to impose New Jersey's garbage on other
states while preventing other states from disposing of their garbage in New Jersey. This would
result in environmental discrimination of the worst kind.
30. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 143 (1851).
31. See Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346, 351 (1939).
32. The existence of varying local conditions indicates that the state legislature is in a
better position than the national legislature to make sound judgments as to how to regulate
the subject matter. In Cooley, the Court upheld a requirement that local pilots be hired to
guide interstate vessels through local waters, noting that local harbor conditions are highly
variable. The Court likewise upheld South Carolina's restriction of the width of trucks trav-
ersing state highways. South Carolina State Hwy. Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177
(1938). The Court noted that the local terrain varies substantially and that each state is
responsible for the maintenance of its highways. Trucks required to meet South Carolina's
width restriction were, of course, forced to either (1) operate with those reduced widths on
interstate journeys to or through the state, or (2) transfer loads to and from wider trucks at
the state line. Despite this obvious impact on interstate commerce, the statute was sustained.
Id. at 187.
33. A dominant federal interest is likely to be found where the state regulation invades the
field of foreign affairs. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (state sedition
act that punished sedition against the state or the nation); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52
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strong possibility that conflicting local regulations will significantly
impede interstate commerce. State regulation of radiological emis-
sions from nuclear power plants was held to be preempted by the
Atomic Energy Act in Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota."
While the court concerned itself primarily with express preemption,
it also noted the need for national uniform regulation arising from
a dominant federal interest in controlling radiological emissions.5
The Supreme Court upheld a Detroit ordinance limiting smoke
emissions from ships, virtually all of which were engaged in inter-
state commerce, over a strong implied preemption attack in Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit.3 The possibility that var-
ious local regulations might subject interstate vessels to conflicting
commands was deemed insufficient to invalidate the ordinance. 3 7
Burbank's restriction of jet arrival and departure times did not fare
so well in Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.3 8 An ordinance
placed a curfew on nighttime jet flights in order to reduce noise. The
Court readily concluded that noise regulation falls within the tradi-
tional local police power, 39 but found that pervasive federal regula-
tion preempted the ordinance. The basis for the finding of perva-
siveness was the need for a national uniform system of regulation."
The Court pointed to the possibility that other localities, in differ-
ent time zones, might impose such curfews and thus substantially
interfere with national flight patterns."
(1941) (state alien registration act). In the field of foreign affairs, the nation must speak with
one voice. Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (involving
the President's foreign affairs power). Otherwise, a single state's action could jeopardize
national interests. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (dicta).
34. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); see Utility Consumers
Council v. Public Service Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 688, 698-99 (Mo. App. 1978); Note,
Preemption Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 11 TULSA L.J. 397 (1976). California's
moratorium on new nuclear power plants, pending a permanent solution to the problem of
disposing of nuclear wastes, has recently come under similar commerce clause and preemp-
tion attacks. See 6 Energy Daily No. 192 at 1 (Oct. 4, 1978).
35. 447 F.2d at 1153. But see Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7422 (Supp. 1977).
36. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
37. Id. at 448.
38. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
39. Id. at 638.
40. Id. at 639. This is a classic example of a purported preemption holding based squarely
on a dormant commerce clause rationale. See text accompanying notes 15-21 supra.
41. Id. at 639. A court upheld Chicago's ban on the sale of phosphate detergents in Proctor
& Gamble Co. v. Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1975). Discharge of phosphates into the
Illinois River apparently resulted in excessive growth of nuisance algae. The court refused to
consider the possibility that conflicting local regulations might unduly burden an interstate
1979l
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Perhaps the most significant recent decision in this area is Ray
v. Atlantic Richfield Co." The Washington tanker law,43 inter alia:
(1) required oil tankers of a certain size operating in Puget Sound
(a) to possess certain design characteristics," or, alternatively (b) to
be escorted by tugs through the Sound,4 5 and (2) prohibited tankers
exceeding 125,000 dead weight tons from entering the Sound under
any circumstances." The Court held that the design requirements
and size limitation were preempted by the Federal Ports and Water-
ways Safety Act,47 but upheld the alternative tug requirement.
With respect to the design requirements, the four-justice plurality
concluded that Congress intended to establish a uniform national
system of regulation of tanker design." This conclusion basically
rested on the view that regulation of the structural design of oil
tankers operating in interstate and foreign commerce presented "a
compelling need for uniformity of decision-making., 4 The plurality
producer of detergents. The court relied on Huron (and conveniently ignored Burbank) for
the proposition that actual rather than potential conflict between various local regulations is
required to invalidate local environmental legislation. 509 F.2d at 77.
42. 435 U.S. 151 (1978); see Ray v. Atlantic Richfield: A Case for Preemption, 5 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 563 (1978).
43. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 88.16.170 (Supp. 1975).
44. The design requirements included a certain weight-to-shaft horsepower ratio, twin
screws, double bottoms, and two radars. 435 U.S. at 160. According to the record in the case,
no tanker presently afloat meets all these design requirements. Id. at 181 n.1 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45. 435 U.S. at 160.
46. Id. at 173.
47. 33 U.S.C. §1221 (1976); 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. V 1975).
48. 435 U.S. at 163. The plurality's analysis of the preemption question is particularly
illuminating. The Court noted that the smoke abatement ordinance in Huron, see text accom-
panying notes 36 & 37 supra, was upheld in part because it was aimed at environmental
protection while the federal statute in that case was aimed at ship boiler safety. The Court
found that the Washington tanker law and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act were both
aimed at environmental protection. The Court thus read the state and federal statutes to
represent conflicting legislative judgments about the same substantive object. In this situa-
tion, the Court found that the federal judgment overrode the state's judgment under the
supremacy clause. Id. at 165.
49. Id. at 178-79 n.28. Contrast the decision in South Carolina State Hwy. Dep't v. Barn-
well Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938), upholding South Carolina's regulation of the design of
interstate trucks. See note 32 supra. Two concurring justices expressly relied on "[tlhe
federal interest in uniform regulation of commerce on the high seas" as the principal justifica-
tion for striking down the Washington design requirements. 435 U.S. at 187 (Stevens, J., and
Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The purported preemption holding of
the plurality and concurring Justices was, once again, based on a dormant commerce clause
rationale. See text accompanying notes 15-21 & note 40 supra. Three justices, dissenting on
204
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likened the tug requirement to the requirement of a local pilot in
Cooley, 1 and thus held that requiring a vessel to use a tug escort in
a particular body of water does not demand a uniform national
rule.' The plurality, with two justices concurring, concluded that
the tanker size limitation was preempted by the uniform federal
decision-making scheme in essentially the same manner that the
design requirements were preempted." The Court stated that be-
cause both the state and federal statutes were aimed at the general
goal of environmental protection, the federal judgment not to limit
tanker size superseded the state judgment.53 Justice Marshall bit-
ingly criticized this position, arguing that the state size limitation
was not aimed at "environmental protection generally" but was
tailored to respond to unique local harbor conditions-"in particu-
lar, the unusual susceptibility of Puget Sound to damage from large
oil spills and the peculiar navigational problems associated with
tanker operations in the Sound." 54
The confusion in the cases points up the infirmity of the Cooley
test, particularly in the environmental context. Most cases do not
fit neatly and exclusively into either conceptual category (those
demanding national uniform regulation or those peculiarly adapted
this point, did not reach the question of the validity of the design requirements because the
alternative tug requirement was considerably less expensive and thus was the exclusive
means employed by tankers to comply with the statute. 435 U.S. at 181 (Marshall, J.,
Brennan, J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50. 435 U.S. at 179; see text accompanying notes 30-32, supra.
51. The plurality also concluded that the tug requirement did not interfere with foreign
affairs because the cost of tug escorts was too low to induce tankers to comply with the state's
design requirements. 435 U.S. at 180. Three justices concurred with the plurality on the
validity bf the tug requirement. 435 U.S. at 181 (Marshall, J., Brennan, J. and Rehnquist,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Two justices concluded that the design and
tug requirements were inseparable and hence that the federal interest in uniformity overrode
both provisions. 435 U.S. at 188-90 (Stevens, J., and Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
52. 435 U.S. at 173-76 (plurality opinion); Id. at 187-88 (Stevens, J., and Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. See note 48 supra. The Court's analysis in Ray curiously contrasts with the analysis
in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
54. 435 U.S. at 184-85 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote
omitted). In a footnote, Justice Marshall quoted the legislative findings incorporated in the
Washington law. Those findings, inter alia, pointed out that the Sound is a relatively confined
salt water environment with irregular depths and shorelines thus creating "a greater than
usual likelihood of long-term damage from any large oil spill." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
88.16.170 (Supp. 1975), 435 U.S. at 185 n.6; see Ray v. Atlantic Richfield: A Case for
Preemption, 5 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 563, 587-88 (1978).
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to local regulation); they implicate both state and federal interests
in varying degrees. If the state enactment impedes interstate com-
merce at all, some degree of need for national uniform regulation
will arise from the free trade value embodied in the commerce
clause. Some need for varying state regulation will almost always
be present because of the varying nature of local environments. The
Cooley test invites a court to hide behind a verbal incantation with-
out revealing its reasoning. It is altogether too easy for a court to
grasp for a talisman like a "need for national uniform regulation"
without expressly recognizing and reconciling the competing inter-
ests involved. While the Cooley test is useful in resolving some com-
merce clause challenges to state environmental legislation,5" in most
cases the Cooley test merely poses the problem and does not render
the solution. These cases generally require a court to utilize a
"balancing" approach.
3. The Balancing Approach
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,56 the Court invalidated the
state's limit on the length of trains by balancing the need for na-
tional uniform regulation against the state's asserted safety interest.
The Court noted that the practical effect of Arizona's law was to
limit the length of trains for miles outside the state and to substan-
tially interfere with interstate commerce. 57 The Court examined the
relevant factual data, determined that the safety value of the length
limitation was minimal, and held that the need for uniform regula-
tion outweighed the state's interest. 8
A somewhat different formulation of the balancing test was artic-
ulated in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc."9 There the Court bal-
anced the safety value of Illinois' requirement that trucks use con-
tour mudguards against the "burden" imposed on commerce by the
requirement." In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.," the Court held that
Washington's requirement that oil tankers utilize tug escorts in
Puget Sound did not substantially burden commerce; the cost of
55. See analysis of cases in category one; text accompanying notes 91-94, infra.
56. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
57. Id. at 775.
58. Id. at 779, 783-84.
59. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
60. Id. at 530.
61. 435 U.S. 151 (1978); see text accompanying notes 42-54, supra.
[Vol. 13:197
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compliance per barrel of oil was insignificant. 2 This formulation of
the balancing test-factually demonstrated state interest versus
burden on commerce-was recently restated as a key test for adjust-
ing state and federal interests under the commerce clause.1
3
The key difficulty with the balancing approach is that a court
almost unavoidably makes a legislative judgment. 4 The court hears
facts that support the state's judgment that the activity in question
threatens the local environment and that the statute will help alle-
viate the threat. The court hears the facts that demonstrate a bur-
den on commerce. The court then decides what the facts warrant.
4. The Less Restrictive Alternative
An adjunct to the balancing test is the "less restrictive alterna-
tive" approach. This test was definitively irticulated in Dean Milk
Co. v. Madison.65 The Court invalidated the city's requirement that
all milk sold in the city be pasteurized at an approved plant within
five miles of the city. The Court noted that city officials could
inspect plants outside the five-mile radius and thus achieve the
city's health interest with substantially less restriction of interstate
milk shipments. The less restrictive alternative approach is seldom
used as an exclusive basis for a commerce clause decision. It is
usually tacked on as an additional consideration in a case involving
either discrimination or an undue burden on commerce. 6
The less restrictive alternative approach will prove fruitless in
most environmental cases. In the typical case, a state makes a judg-
ment that a given level of environmental harm or risk is acceptable
and defines the level in terms of detailed regulations. A court's
pronouncement that a less restrictive alternative exists usually has
the effect of substituting the court's judgment that a potentially
greater level of harm or risk is acceptable." This effectively means
62. 435 U.S. at 179-80.
63. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 (1978); see also California v.
Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728 (1949).
64. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, Rock Island, & Pac. R.R., 393
U.S. 129, 136 (1968); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Chicago, 509 F.2d 69, 75-76 (7th Cir. 1975);
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield: A Case for Preemption, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 563, 569-70 (1978);
Environmental Legislation, supra note 5 at 1778 & n.90.
65. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
66. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 373 (1976).
67. In environmental cases, a court can rarely be confident that its "less restrictive" regula-
1979]
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that the court finds the state's desired level of protection less impor-
tant than some national interest. A disguised balancing of state and
federal interests is thus executed under the table. The less restric-
tive alternative approach is, therefore, analytically dishonest unless
the court devises an alternative that results in the same level of
harm or risk as the challenged enactment. This may explain why
this approach is rarely used in the environmental context.
5. The Tax Case Analogy: Making Commerce "Pay Its Way"
The Supreme Court has upheld local taxes on interstate commer-
cial activities in a number of cases. 8 The basic theory is that inter-
state commerce may be forced to compensate a state for the costs
which that commerce imposes on the state." Of course, a tax that
on its face applies exclusively to interstate transactions may be
invalidated on the groutd that it discriminates against interstate
commerce. 0 On the other hand, a tax that on its face applies even-
handedly to intrastate and interstate interests is likely to be upheld,
even if the incidence of the tax falls almost exclusively on interstate
commerce, provided that the tax is fair and reasonably approxi-
mates the cost imposed on the state by that commerce.7 1 In this way,
commerce can be forced to "pay its way" through a state.72
At least two cases73 and two commentators 4 have suggested that
tion will insure a level of environmental protection as high as the challenged state enactment.
In Ray, for example, Washington decided that certain design criteria were necessary to make
oil tankers acceptably safe while operating in Puget Sound. See text accompanying notes 40
and 44 through 48, supra. If a court eliminated any of those requirements or substituted others
that were less burdensome on commerce, the almost inevitable result would be a greater risk
of oil spillage than the Washington legislature voted to accept.
68. See, e.g., Department of Rev. of Washington v. Ass'n of Washington Stevedoring Cos.,
435 U.S. 734 (1978); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Colonial
Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975).
69. See Environmental Legislation, supra note 5, at 1782.
70. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (discriminatory tax
on interstate stock transactions).
71. See Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707,
716-17 (1972) (upholding $1 per passenger enplaning charge designed to defray cost of air-
port).
72. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 281 (1977).
73. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Improv. Comm'n, 307 A.2d 1 (Me.), appeal
dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973); American Can Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 517 P.2d 691
(Ore. App. 1973).
74. Environmental Legislation, supra note 5 at 1782; Tarlock, Oil Pollution on Lake
Superior, 61 MINN. L. REv. 63, 117 (1976).
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the effect of some state environmental legislation is merely to force
interstate commerce to "internalize" what would otherwise be an
external cost imposed by such commerce on the state. In Portland
Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Commission,7
Maine required a /2 cent per barrel license fee for transferring oil
over water and imposed strict vicarious liability on oil terminal
operators for oil spills. 16 The fund from the license fees was to be
held and applied solely for the purpose of spill prevention and clean-
up. The court likened the license fee to a non-discriminatory tax on
commerce designed to make commerce pay its just share of state tax
burdens.7 The court held that part of that "just share" was the cost
of preventing and remedyirig a harm caused by a danger inherent
in the commerce being taxed. In effect, the interstate oil interests
were merely being forced to pay the cost of a regulatory scheme
designed to reduce the effects of a peril created by those interstate
interests. 8 The court thus upheld the state statute.79
This analysis can be applied to virtually all non-discriminatory
state environmental legislation. The cost imposed on the local envi-
ronment by interstate commerce is economically equivalent to the
cost of preventing irreversible environmental damage. 0 State legis-
lation designed to prevent environmental harm merely imposes the
economic cost of prevention on the interstate commerce that creates
the hazard. Thus, there is no "burden" on commerce at all: it is
merely forced to "pay its way."
There are two flaws in this approach. First, interstate commerce
must pay the cost based on a local judgment as to the value of the
local environment and the risk of environmental harm that is ac-
75. See note 73 supra.
76. Cf. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (unanimously
upholding Florida's imposition of strict liability for oil spills on waterfront handling facilities
and ships; in face of admiralty clause and preemption challenges).
77. 307 A.2d at 37.
78. 307 A.2d at 37, 38.
79. See also American Can Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 517 P.2d 691 (Ore. App. 1973);
Note, 55 N.C.L. Rav. 461 (1977).
80. This may not always work out with clean symmetry. The cost of efficient clean-up may
be less than the cost of prevention in some instances. In these circumstances, the state may
arguably impose the cost of clean-up on the commerce that causes the damage. See Portland
Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Improv. Comm'n, 307 A.2d at 37; cf. Askew v. American
Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (upholding state's imposition of strict liability
for oil spills on oil transfer facilities and ships).
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ceptable. The cost of compliance with the state's regulatory scheme
is not in proportion to a uniform "national mean pollution accepta-
bility factor. '81 Thus, interstate commerce is forced to pay an addi-
tional premium to keep the local environment particularly clean for
the local residents based on a local value judgment that those en-
gaged in interstate commerce had comparatively little voice in mak-
ing. The tax analogy thus does not represent a "no cost" option to
interstate commercial concerns: it does not escape the necessity of
balancing the state interest in exacting the premium for a uniquely
clean environment against the burden that premium places on in-
terstate commerce. Second, it is impossible to confine the tax anal-
ogy to environmental cases. It can plausibly be argued that the state
in Southern Pacific"2 merely sought to force the railroads to internal-
ize the cost of preventing a safety hazard resulting from long trains
that the railroads used within the state. The extension of the tax
analogy thus results in the conclusion that no legitimate exercise of
state police power really burdens commerce at all. The absurdity of
the conclusion suggested by this second point reinforces the validity
of the first point: a state enactment that seeks to keep the state
cleaner than the nation as a whole does impose a cost on commerce.
II. TIPPING THE BALANCE: A CLOSER LOOK AT STATE ENVIRONMENTAL
INTERESTS
A. Nature of the Problem: A Conflict of Interests
The core problem confronting a court when state environmental
legislation is challenged under the commerce clause is a conflict of
value judgments between two levels of government, each of which
seeks to promote legitimate interests. The commerce clause embod-
ies a national value judgment designed to protect the national inter-
est in free trade. The national values that may be impaired by state
environmental legislation are primarily commercial or economic.s
81. One commentator notes that it is possible to argue that interstate business "should pay
for that portion of their pollution sufficient to reach a cleanliness level equal to the average
of the nation" and that local residents "should pay for the additional cost of reaching a higher
living standard" or keeping a "uniquely clean environment." Environmental Legislation,
supra note 5, at 1784.
82. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), text accompanying notes 56-58
supra.
83. Some state environmental legislation, such as oil tanker regulation, may raise the
spectre of interference with foreign affairs. See note 51 supra. State legislation deserves less
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The nature of this national commercial interest is essentially the
same in virtually all commerce clause cases, though the degree that
it is impeded varies substantially from case to case.s' State legisla-
tive judgments embodied in state environmental protection statutes
are generally designed to promote local health and welfare.
When these state and federal interests collide, the natural tend-
ency is to hold that the federal interest overrides the state interest
by virtue of the supremacy clause." Two factors, however, suggest
that this may not be an appropriate result. First, local environments
differ markedly from state to state. Geographical and meteorologi-
cal conditions, as well as the degree of man's despoilation of the
environment, vary so widely that the appropriateness of local regu-
lation is strongly suggested. 6 Second, the people who live in a given
area are more directly interested in their surroundings than the
national body politic.87 Thus, the nation can too easily disregard the
interests of the local body politic because (1) the same increment
of pollution may have a drastically more deleterious effect on the
local environment than it has on the national environment, ss and (2)
deference when such an overriding national interest is involved. See note 33 supra.
84. This statement appears on its face to be too simplistic. It can be argued that the
statement obfuscates the complexity and diversity of national concerns. Federal legislation
enacted under the commerce power serves a wide variety of substantive purposes-protection
of competitive markets, consumer protection, social welfare, harmonious race relations, and
enhancement of the environment, to name a few. Thus, the substantive purpose of the federal
statute and the statute's means for effecting that purpose, coupled with the federal interest
in free trade among the states, are the real federal interests that should be balanced against
state interests.
The difficulty with this argument is that it confuses express preemption issues with dor-
mant commerce clause issues. Any conflict between federal and state statutory purposes or.
provisions should be resolved under the rubric of express preemption. When state legislation
is "impliedly" preempted because of a "need for national uniformity" or a "dominant federal
interest" apart from a statute's substantive purpose, the federal interest usually implicated
is the commercial interest in free trade. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S. Ct. 2531, 2535
(1978); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728 (1940). But see note 83 supra. The weight to be
attributed to this federal interest depends on the degree that it is impaired in a particular
case.
85. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. at 165.
86. The New York resident may be willing to accept a little more industrial waste in the
Hudson because the incremental damage would be slight, while the Washington resident
would shudder at the thought of ruined fishing and recreation if the same amount of in-
dustrial waste were dumped in the Columbia River.
87. If a tanker runs aground in Puget Sound, the Washington resident must live with oily
shores and dead fish and birds, while the Floridian comfortably reads about the event in his
newspaper.
88. A given increment of pollution may pose a much greater threat to a pristine local
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
local environmental harm does not directly affect people nationally
as it does local residents.
The typical commerce clause challenge to state environmental
legislation thus involves a direct clash of two substantial values. A
state will make a value judgment that a given environmental risk
is unacceptable. This judgment will collide with the free trade value
embodied in the commerce clause. Casting a court in the role of a
super-legislature is probably unavoidable in this context; the court
must arbitrate the competing interests by a weighing process."
B. State Environinental Interests and the Balancing Approach"0
In the absence of discrimination against commerce, there are at
least three categories of environmental cases to which different con-
siderations apply in determining the appropriate weight of state
interests in the balancing process. The three categories described
below are not offered as creating simple and automatic solutions to
concrete cases by a process of facile classification; few cases will fall
exclusively into any single category. Rather, these categories are
urged as aids to the identification of appropriate factors in deter-
mining the weight to be ascribed to a given state enactment in the
balancing process in a given case. The courts have seldom recog-
nized these factors and thus have often gravely underestimated the
weight of state environmental interests in the face of commerce
clause attacks.
In the first category of cases, a given commercial activity causes
the same type and degree of harm or risk in any state because the
pertinent conditions are essentially the same nationwide. ThQ state
legislature merely makes a different value judgment about the ac-
environment than to the national environment. See discussion of Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978), text accompanying notes 99 and 101-02, infra. See also note 86 supra.
On the other hand, an increment of another pollutant may dissipate and become unnoticeable
in a pristine environment, though it would cause a threshold of harm to be passed in a dirtier
local environment. See discussion of Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.
1975), text accompanying notes 100 and 103 infra. This highlights the need to evaluate the
facts of particular cases. The important point is that local judgments about peculiar local
facts deserve judicial deference. See note 32 supra.
89. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield: A Case for Preemption, 5 HASTINGS CCNsT. L.Q. 563, 569-
70 (1978).
90. This article leaves aside the question of the appropriate weight of federal interests in
the balancing process, see notes 33 & 84 supra, and concentrates on developing an analytical
structure for determining the weight of state interests.
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ceptability of that harm or risk to the local body politic. Traditional
commerce clause cases falling within this category are Southern
Pacific" and Bibb. 2 A long train presents essentially the same dan-
gers in New Mexico as it does in Arizona. Contour mudguards are
just as necessary (or unnecessary) in Arkansas as they are in Illinois.
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,'3 an environmental case,
probably also falls in this category. Radiological emissions are basi-
cally no more or less dangerous in Minnesota than they are in Ten-
nessee.
JI cases falling within the first category, a court will defer to the
local legislative judgment unless there is a substantial interference
with commerce." If there is such an interference, the state judgment
must give way. Implicit in this result is the conclusion that the same
environmental harm or risk is acceptable for all states in light of the
national interest in free trade.
In the second category of cases, a given commercial activity
causes the same type but different degrees of harm or risk in various
states because of varying local conditions. In a state where the de-
gree of harm or risk is greater, the state may make a value judgment
that that degree of harm or risk is unacceptable. This involves more
than the sheer value judgment of a given risk applicable throughout
the nation is unacceptable. In South Carolina Highway Department
v. Barnwell Brothers,"- the essence of the state's position was that
wide trucks posed a peculiar risk on narrow South Carolina high-
ways. Though the nature of the risk of collision was the same in all
states, 6 the magnitude of risk was greater on narrow roadsY Argua-
bly, the Huron and Burbank cases fall within this category." Detroit
91. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), see text accompanying notes 56-
58, supra.
92. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959), see text accompanying notes
59-63, supra. o
93. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
94. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. at 529.
95. 303 U.S. 177 (1938); see note 32 supra.
96. Being hit by a truck in South Carolina is no different from being hit by a truck in
Oregon.
97. South Carolina could eliminate this peculiar risk by widening its highways. Ultimately,
the Court was unwilling to force the state to either (1) submit to the peculiar local risk, or
(2) undertake the substantial expenditures that would be required to widen roads across
South Carolina terrain.
98. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); see text accompanying
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harbor is a congested and smoky area. A given amount of pollution
that would dissipate on an open lake would add to the concentration
of pollution in Detroit. Once a given threshold of pollution is passed,
incremental additions to that level may cause more harm than
would be caused in cleaner areas. Similarly, the proximity of high-
density residential neighborhoods to the Burbank airport suggests
a higher degree of disturbance from airport noise than at Washing-
ton, D.C.'s Dulles Airport, which is conveniently located in the
middle of nowhere.
In cases falling within the second category, the state interest is
stronger and more deserving of deference by a court. The state is
subjected to a greater harm or risk from the same activity than the
nation as a whole. If the state's legislation were overridden, it would
be forced to pay a higher cost than its sister states to advance the
federal interest in free trade.
In the third category of cases, a given commercial activity causes
different types and degrees of harm or risk in various states because
of varying local conditions. Many environmental harms are not sim-
ple cause-effect harms like the threatened train accidents and ensu-
ing damage in Southern Pacific or the threatened truck accidents
and ensuing damage in Barnwell. Environmental pollutants often
interact with peculiar local ecosystems to produce different kinds of
harm in different localities. Many environmental cases may be sui
generis in this respect. When a state acts to prevent such a harm,
much more is involved than a simple legislative judgment that a
given harm or risk applicable throughout the nation is unaccepta-
ble.
Cases falling within this category include Ray v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co." and Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Chicago."' In Ray, the
Washington legislature was concerned that oil spills in the confined
and relatively unsullied salt water environment of Puget Sound
would create a great danger of long-term damage '"' that would not
be present in the case of a coastal spill where oil would soon break
up. Though the plurality in Ray indicated that both the state and
notes 36 & 37, supra; Burbank v. Lockheed Air Term., 411 U.S. 624 (1973,; see text accompa-
nying notes 38-41 supra.
99. 435 U.S. 151 (1978); see text accompanying notes 42-54 supra.
100. 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1975); see note 41 supra.
101. See note 54 supra.
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federal statutes were aimed at environmental protection, it is not
at all clear that the two statutes "therefore" had the same purpose
nor that the federal judgment should automatically override the
state's judgment. Justice Marshall correctly noted that the Wash-
ington statute was designed to reduce the threat of a particular type
of environmental harm resulting from peculiar local conditions. 1 2 In
Proctor & Gamble, phosphate discharges would not produce nuis-
ance algae in rivers until the ambient level of phosphates reached a
certain threshold. No environmental harm would result at all unless
peculiar local conditions were ripe for interaction with the environ-
mental pollution." 3
In cases falling within the third category, the state interest is
often extremely strong and deserving of judicial deference. The state
is subjected to a harm or risk from a given activity that may not be
tangibly felt by the nation. If the state's legislation were overridden,
the state would be forced to pay a cost to advance the federal inter-
est in free trade that other states would not pay."0 ' It is not at all
102. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
103. 509 F.2d at 73-74.
104. It can be argued that the same is often true with respect to local economic interests.
For example, when federal air quality legislation discourages the use of high-sulfur coal, some
eastern coal-producing regions suffer greater economic sacrifice than the rest of the nation in
the name of protecting the national environment. Thus, it is argued, either the author's
rationale supports greater deference to local interests generally or the author is guilty of
making the assumption that environmental interests generally are more important than
economic interests.
This argument is unconvincing for two reasons. First, the example involves an express
preemption issue rather than a commerce clause issue. If federal legislation conflicts with
local legislation, the supremacy clause dictates that the federal scheme prevail regardless of
the substantive purposes of the respective statutes and despite disparate burdens imposed
on the states. Congress will presumably have confronted the issue of disparate state burdens
and will have concluded that the federal goal is worth the cost. This is not the case when the
commerce clause's concern for free trade and national economic welfare forces a court to
balance state interests against national commercial interests. Second, and more importantly,
local economic interests bear a different relationship to national free trade concerns than do
local environmental interests. Legislation which is designed to effectively protect a local
economy but which burdens interstate commerce appropriates X-dollars to the state at a cost
of Y-dollars to the nation. The theory underlying the commerce clause, growing out of con-
crete historical fact, is that if local interests can freely utilize local governmental force to keep
money in the pockets of the "local boys," other states will retaliate and all states will suffer.
For this reason, local economic protection is highly suspect. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
98 S. Ct. 2531, 2535 (1978). The nation as a whole will prosper, in the long run, by preventing
local economic preferences; what the state gives up today will rebound to its and other states'
economic benefit over the course of many tomorrows. Environmental protection bears a
different relation to national commercial interests. Local environmental legislation is often
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clear that the commerce clause was intended to produce such a
result.105
III. CONCLUSION
Mere resort to the supremacy clause in the event of a clash be-
tween a state's judgment, embodied in environmental protection
legislation, and commerce clause values will not result. in a satisfac-
tory solution to many environmental cases. The commerce clause
was designed to prevent "economic Balkanization" that was per-
ceived as inimical to the best interests of all the states. Some degree
of "ecological Balkanization" is probably necessary to ensure an
appropriate adjustment of state and federal interests.
To gain insight into this suggestion, it is necessary to reconsider
the theory behind the discrimination test in commerce clause analy-
sis. The basis of this test is the perception that state legislatures are
relatively insensitive to unrepresented non-resident commercial in-
terests because any harm to the economic interests of the nation will
not be directly felt by the local body politic. This principle applies
inversely in the environmental cases described in categories two and
three above. In such cases, people in the locality are more directly
designed to protect unique local health, aesthetic, and other values that characterize the
surroundings in which local people must live every day. Allowing commerce to run freely over
the local environment does not promise long-term local or national environmental benefits:
in fact, it portends the opposite. This does not mean that local environmental statutes should
always be preferred to national commercial values. It does mean that a court should be more
sensitive to local environmental protection than to local economic prote.ction when either
must be balanced against the commerce clause. But see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S.
Ct. at 2537.
Suppose, however, that the argument above is shifted to focus on a comparison between
local environmental interests and, for example, local safety interests. Is there any difference
between these local concerns that suggests a need for greater deference to one or the other
under the commerce clause? In many cases, there will be no broad analytical difference:
several safety and environmental cases will be most appropriately characterized under cate-
gory two above. More environmental cases, however, are likely to fall in category three, where
particular deference to state legislation is generally warranted.
105. The three categories described above are not clearly distinct. Most cases will not fall
neatly and exclusively into any one category. The real world presents a complex continuum
of factual patterns that often defy precise classification. Nor will a case falling in the third
category always call for greater deference to the state than a case falling in the second
category. A state that suffers a substantially greater degree of a harm shared by other states
may deserve more deference than a state that suffers an isolated but insignificant harm. The
analysis underlying the categories nonetheless identifies important considerations that bear
on the degree of deference due to state environmental statutes under commerce clause attack.
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interested in the local environment. An activity that is not particu-
larly harmful to most of the nation's environment presents a pecu-
liar local environmental hazard. The national body politic does not
directly feel the effect of the hazard. National policies, in the form
of the commerce clause or "pervasive" federal legislation, are un-
likely to take sufficient account of localized environmental im-
pacts. ' The commerce clause is designed to equalize the competi-
tive positions of the states by preventing unwarranted barriers to
free trade, not to require one state to bear a peculiar environmental
hazard not shared by sister states. ' The national free trade value
embodied in the commerce clause thus should not automatically
overcome state* environmental legislation falling in categories two
and three above. 0 8
The Supreme Court presently uses a verbal formulation of the
balancing test that indicates that state regulation will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on commerce is "clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits."'' 0 This verbal formulation
sometimes has little content."10 There is a continuing danger that
the balancing test will be applied without due reflection in environ-
mental cases described in categories two and three above. The bal-
ancing test must be infused with content that adequately reflects
the nature and weight of state interests in each environmental case
if courts are to attain a workable and meaningful allocation of
powers between state and federal governments in the field of
environmental regulation.
106. Seep. 24 supra. But see Ray v. Atlantic Richfield: A Case for Preemption, 5 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 563, 589 (1978).
107. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra. This conclusion is strongly reinforced by
Department of Rev. of Washington v. Ass'n of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734
(1978). In upholding a state tax on stevedoring activities, the Court stated that "[riequiring
coastal states to subsidize the commerce of inland consumers [by preventing reasonable
taxation of commerce as it moves through these states] may well exacerbate, rather than
diminish, rivalries and hostilities." 435 U.S. at 760.
108. This does not mean that all local environmental regulation is per se constitutional in
the same sense that discriminatory local regulation is per se unconstitutional. See notes 23
and 24, supra, and accompanying text. Such state regulation may seek marginal environmen-
tal goals at a tremendous cost to interstate and foreign commerce. However, the presumption
of constitutionality of state legislation should be exceptionally strong in the latter two catego-
ries of environmental cases.
109. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
110. This formulation is sometimes little more than a tip of the hat to state interests
followed by a talismanic incantation of "need for national uniform regulation" and the invali-
dation of the state statute. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. at 157, 165; see
text accompanying notes 44-54 supra.
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